The Controversy that Isn\u27t: The Debate over Daniel J. Goldhagen\u27s Hitler\u27s Willing Executioners in Comparative Perspective by Rosenfeld, Gavriel D.
Fairfield University 
DigitalCommons@Fairfield 
History Faculty Publications History Department 
1999 
The Controversy that Isn't: The Debate over Daniel J. Goldhagen's 
Hitler's Willing Executioners in Comparative Perspective 
Gavriel D. Rosenfeld 
grosenfeld@fairfield.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/history-facultypubs 
Copyright 1999 Cambridge University Press. 
Peer Reviewed 
Repository Citation 
Rosenfeld, Gavriel D., "The Controversy that Isn't: The Debate over Daniel J. Goldhagen's Hitler's Willing 
Executioners in Comparative Perspective" (1999). History Faculty Publications. 57. 
https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/history-facultypubs/57 
Published Citation 
Rosenfeld, G. (1999) "The Controversy that Isn't: The Debate over Daniel J. Goldhagen's Hitler's Willing Executioners 
in Comparative Perspective," Contemporary European History, Volume 8, Nr. 2, 1999, pp. 249-273. 
This item has been accepted for inclusion in DigitalCommons@Fairfield by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It is brought to you by DigitalCommons@Fairfield with permission from the rights-
holder(s) and is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses, you need to obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 
in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@fairfield.edu. 
The Controversy That Isn't: The 
Debate over Daniel J. Goldhagen's 
Hitler's Willing Executioners in 
Comparative Perspective 
GAVRIEL D. ROSENFELD 
Karl Marx's celebrated observation that 'all the events ... of great importance in 
world history 
occur . . . twice . . . [The] first time as tragedy, the second 
as farce' 
may seem out of place in a discussion of the Holocaust. However, this very dictum 
appears to be confirmed by the recent controversy over Daniel J. Goldhagen's 
Hitler's Willing Executioners. Since its publication in the United States in late March, 
and in Germany in early August, 1996, Goldhagen's book has been the subject of 
immense media attention. Not only has it been reviewed by 
numerous scholars and 
journalists in a wide array of publications, it has also been discussed in front of mass 
audiences on television, debated in public symposia, and fought over in cyberspace. 
Most of the critical attention given to Hitler's Willing Executioners has focused 
understandably upon its explanation of the Holocaust as a product of the uniquely 
rabid anti-Semitism of 'ordinary Germans'. The 
reasons 
why the book has caused 
such an international furor, however, have been given far less attention. There was, 
to be sure, much initial speculation about the likelihood of the book sparking a 
substantial scholarly controversy. Some observers in Germany 
even 
predicted the 
outbreak of a new 'historians' debate'.1 Such predictions, though, have proved to be 
largely inaccurate. Although Goldhagen's book has been subjected to many 
vehement attacks, it has prompted little substantive debate to speak of. Debate, after 
all, requires two sides. In the case of Hitler's Willing Executioners, however, the 
match-up has been absurdly unbalanced. Apart from 
some early support in popular 
reviews in the United States and more recent expressions of sympathy from the 
general public in Germany, Goldhagen has for the most part stood alone against his 
critics. Indeed, the near-unanimity of scholarly criticism directed at Hitler's Willing 
Executioners has been acknowledged even by Goldhagen himself, who has responded 
by expressing indignation that all of his critics have so profoundly misread his book. 
The wide span separating the two 'sides' of the Goldhagen controversy raises doubts 
1 This position was represented most actively by Die Zeit, which first provided a forum for many 
historians to engage Goldhagen. See 'Hitlers willige Mordgesellen', Die Zeit, 12 Apr. 1996, 1. See also 
Jost Nolte, 'Sisyphos ist Deutscher', Die Welt, 16 Apr. 1996. 
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about its very character as a debate. There is much, in fact, about the furor 
surrounding Hitler's Willing Executioners that has a palpably artificial feel about it. 
Indeed, in comparison with previous controversies over the Third Reich and the 
Holocaust, it is not an exaggeration to say that the Goldhagen controversy exhibits 
farcical traits. 
One question among many that deserves to be raised is whether the controversy 
surrounding Hitler's Willing Executioners has erupted for reasons larger than the book 
itself. Generally speaking, truly substantive historiographical debates are either 
sparked by pathbreaking works of scholarship or by broader political disputes. 
Recent controversies over the dropping of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima, the 
origins and course of the French Revolution, and the early history of the state of 
Israel are several examples.2 Goldhagen's book, in contrast, fails 
to measure up on 
both of these counts. The consensus of the scholarly community is that, despite its 
claims to have radically reconceptualized Holocaust scholarship, Hitler's Willing 
Executioners represents, at best, only a fairly modest scholarly advance. The possibility 
that his book's critical reception reflects larger political trends 
- for example, as 
some German critics initially speculated, the surfacing of latent political concerns 
among Americans about German reunification 
? likewise seems doubtful. The hype 
surrounding Hitler's Willing Executioners thus seems out of proportion to its actual 
scholarly value. It seems from closely examining the debate as it has progressed so far 
that the Goldhagen affair represents 
a case of induced controversy, of controversy 
for its own sake. 
This appears to be particularly true when one contrasts the furor sparked by 
Hitler's Willing Executioners with previous historiographical controversies involving 
the recent German past. Since the book's appearance, various critics have attempted 
to identify precedents for the Goldhagen controversy. Some have compared the 
impact of Hitler's Willing Executioners with that caused by Fritz Fischer's controversial 
study of the outbreak of the First World War, Griff nach der Weltmacht 
? a book 
which, when published in 1961, launched a prolonged debate among West German 
historians about Germany's responsibility for the First World War and subsequently 
gave rise to a more introspective, self-critical trend in West German historical 
scholarship of the Third Reich.3 The impact of Goldhagen's book has also been 
compared with that of Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem, an accusatory work 
which, in addition to introducing the concept of the 'banality of evil', caused a stir 
among historians in the United States and Israel with its claims about the 
'complicity' of the Jews in their own murders.4 More frequently, Hitler's Willing 
Executioners has been seen as capable of provoking a conflict similar to the 
Historikerstreit, or 'Historians' Debate', of the mid-1980s about the uniqueness of the 
2 See Michael Hogan (ed.), Hiroshima in History and Memory (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), Steven Laurence Kaplan, Farewell Revolution: The Historians' Freud, France, 1789/1989 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1995), and the recent special issue of History and Memory, 
entitled 'Israeli Historiography Revisited', Spring/Summer 1995. 
3 Volker Ullrich, 'Vertraute T?ne', Die Zeit, 14 Jun. 1996, 45. 
4 Berei Lang, 'The Blame Game', Moment, August, 1996, 84-5. 
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Holocaust.5 These comparisons, while intriguing, are unsatisfying in various ways, 
however. One important reason, after all, for the controversy surrounding Hitler's 
Willing Executioners (at least in the Federal Republic, where a knee-jerk defensive 
ness was the early response) is Goldhagen's 'outsider' status as an American (and, to 
boot, a Jewish) scholar writing on the most sensitive topic of recent German history. 
In contrast, the Fischer controversy and the Historians' Debate were largely internal 
German affairs, while the Arendt book stirred emotions most forcefully within 
Jewish crides. A more instructive comparison, and in many ways the most obvious 
precedent to the Goldhagen controversy, was the furor caused by a work of another 
American: William L. Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich in 1960-62. 
Comparing the debates sparked by Shirer's and Goldhagen's books reveals many 
instructive parallels about the differences in scholarly and public perceptions of the 
Third Reich. At the same time, however, such a comparison 
- between the first 
postwar study of the Nazi era to spark international controversy and the most recent 
book to do so ? reveals the insubstantial dimensions of the debate surrounding the 
latter. 
In the vast historiography on the Nazi period, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich 
occupies a unique place.6 As the first comprehensive postwar study of Hitler's rise to 
power and of the subsequent Nazi dictatorship, it ranks as the best-selling work ever 
written on the subject. The commercial success of The Rise and Fall of the Third 
Reich was immediate; when published in i960, the massive book 
- 
nearly 1,250 
pages in length 
- was a runaway best-seller in the United States, selling over 1 
million copies in the first year alone. This success, moreover, has continued up to 
the present day. In the thirty-five years since its appearance, it has sold many 
millions of copies, a fact that has given it the reputation of being the best-selling 
work of history of all time. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, moreover, was as 
controversial as it was commercially successful. While it garnered great critical 
acclaim in the United States, the book was bitterly attacked by critics in West 
Germany, who uniformly condemned it as a mean-spirited, anti-German polemic 
that distorted German history and threatened to damage German?American 
relations. The numerous attacks levelled against the book by German critics, 
however, did not prevent the German version of the book, Aufstieg und Fall des 
Dritten Reiches, from being on the bestseller list for six months after its initial 
publication in autumn 1961. There, too, the controversy and commercial success of 
the book were mutually sustaining. Over the span of two years, 1960-62, Shirer's 
book sparked the most extended public debate about the German past since the end 
of the Second World War. 
What was it about The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich that caused such sharply 
differing reactions in the United States and West Germany? To begin with, Shirer's 
5 Volker Ullrich, 'Hitlers willige Mordgesellen', Die Zeit, 12 Apr. 1996, 1; see also Nomi Morris, 
'Owning up to Evil', Maclean's, 3 Jun. 1996, 59. 
6 For a full discussion of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich and its impact in the early 1960s, see 
Gavriel D. Rosenfeld, 'The Reception of William L. Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich in the 
United States and West Germany, 1960-62', Journal of Contemporary History, 1 (1994), 95-129. 
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basic explanation of the roots of the Third Reich was controversial from a 
historiographical standpoint. From the outset of his book, Shirer made abundantly 
clear his belief that 'Nazism and the Third Reich . . . were but a logical 
continuation of German history'. Rooted in longstanding traditions of militarism 
and authoritarianism, supported by a submissive and obedient German population, 
the Third Reich, he argued, was the logical capstone of a tradition of national 
deviance. This was, to be sure, hardly a novel argument. Indeed, it marked a 
reversion to the notorious 'Luther to Hitler' view of German history, 
an overdrawn, 
deterministic perspective that was commonly espoused during the 1930s and 1940s 
- 
precisely the period in which Shirer acquired his first-hand understanding of the 
Nazi state as a journalist based in Berlin. By i960, however, this explanatory schema 
for the Third Reich was increasingly rejected, although not altogether abandoned, 
by historians and political scientists. At this point in time, Cold War tensions had 
created an intellectual climate receptive to the theoretical paradigm of totalitarianism 
- the belief that the Nazi and Soviet dictatorships were fundamentally similar and 
historically rooted in wider European social, economic, and political trends. The 
extent to which these two competing historiographical explanations of the Nazi 
state were accepted in the United States and West Germany during the early 1960s 
was one important factor in determining the contrasting reactions to The Rise and 
Fall of the Third Reich.7 
In the United States, the reaction to The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich was on 
the whole positive and, 
at times, effusive. Among Shirer's journalistic colleagues, 
the book received widespread acclaim, being hailed by John G?nther, for instance, 
as 'one of the most spectacular stories ever told' and by Orville Prescott as 'one of 
the most important works of history of 
our time'. Historians, too, such as Hugh R. 
Trevor-Roper, Geoffrey Barraclough and Gordon Craig, described the book as 
'masterly' and 'monumental' and supported its emphasis on the Third Reich's 
German roots. Such praise, moreover, 
was neither shallow 
nor 
fleeting. Indeed, the 
broad-based respect for The Rise and Fallqfthe Third Reich was clearly demonstrated 
in early 1961, when it was awarded the prestigious National Book Award. To be 
sure, the praise directed towards the book 
was not unanimous. Many scholars 
disputed both its claims of originality and its thesis that the origins of Nazism lay 
primarily in the particular features of German history. Speaking for many, one of 
Shirer's most vociferous critics, the German historian Klaus Epstein, emphatically 
dismissed what he called the journalist's 'rewarming of the wartime tale that German 
history is a one-way road leading from Luther to Hitler' and asserted that this thesis 
reflected not only Shirer's inability 'to 
. . . adequately comprehend the nature of a 
modern totalitarian state' but his 'systematic prejudice when dealing with Germany's 
cultural heritage'. Such objections were typical of much of the scholarly reaction to 
The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Given the fact that Shirer was a journalist and an 
outsider to academia, the negative reaction 
to his work was not surprising. For the 
7 
Ibid., 102-3, 107 
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most part, however, scholarly criticisms of Shirer's book were not heard in the 
deafening roar of critical acclaim bestowed upon it.8 
In West Germany, however, negative criticism 
was the standard response to The 
Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. In numerous reviews of the book in the press, 
German critics uniformly attacked The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich on a variety of 
counts. Both journalists and historians claimed that Shirer's view of German history 
was hopelessly flawed, describing it as 'simplistic', reminiscent of 'the clich?s 
employed by Allied propaganda in the First and Second World Wars', and barely of 
'elementary school sophistication'. Asserting that his work was 'based on the state of 
knowledge [of the Nazi period] of 1950', German reviewers attacked Shirer for 
having ignored the theoretical model of totalitarianism which then held sway in the 
Federal Republic as the dominant explanatory model for the Third Reich. As 
Martin Broszat and others noted, 'a history of National Socialism that is worthy of 
the name . . . cannot ... be written by 
someone who completely passes 
over the 
core of the problem 
- totalitarianism in its specifically National Socialist form'. 
Beyond calling into question Shirer's scholarly credentials, moreover, German 
reviewers levelled ad hominem attacks against him, calling him a German-hater 
who viewed the Germans as a 'dangerous race' and approached his subject with the 
'soul . . . of a Nuremberg prosecutor'. Shirer, in short, 
was seen as 
handicapped by 
longstanding prejudices against Germans, which prevented him from accepting 
recent scholarship that exonerated the nation from exclusive responsibility for the 
Nazi disaster. And yet, the controversy was not merely a matter of competing 
historiographical models.9 
The vehemence of the German reaction to the The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich 
points to a second and equally significant reason for the furor it evoked: Cold War 
politics. As critical reviewers in the United States and the Federal Republic 
forcefully argued, Shirer's resurrection of the memory of Nazism 
? 
and, more 
importantly, its specifically German roots 
? 
threatened to undermine German 
American relations at a particularly sensitive point in the Cold War conflict. During 
the period 1958?61, a unique constellation of events made it appear as if public 
concern about Germany's Nazi past might threaten the stability of the Western 
alliance. The infamous wave of swastika daubings 
on synagogues in Germany at the 
end of 1959 and the beginning of i960, the simultaneous disclosure of the presence 
of ex-Nazis in the Bonn government, and, most dramatically, the capture and 
subsequent trial of Adolf Eichmann in May i960, placed Nazism once again at the 
centre of worldwide media attention. At the same time, the West's weak response 
to the Berlin crisis of 1958 and its total acquiescence in the erection of the Berlin 
wall in 1961 led many Germans to fear a link between the new unflattering light on 
their Nazi past and weakening American support for the Federal Republic.10 
According to many observers in Germany, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich was 
8 
Ibid., pp. 105-8. 
9 
Ibid., pp. 114-17. 
10 
Ibid., pp. 103-4. 
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a 'dangerous book' that contributed directly to this worrisome political situation. In 
fact, Shirer did raise implicit questions about the Federal Republic's postwar 
trustworthiness in his study, noting that the nation's 'spiritual break with the West 
. . . has not been healed to this day' and insisting that it was 'too early to speak . . . 
with any certainty' about the destruction of its militaristic and authoritarian 
traditions. In West Germany, many critics worried about what effect the book's 
commercial success in the United States portended for American views of their 
nation. While some saw The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich as responsible for 
'producing the scepticism that has recently arisen in America with regard to the 
Germans', others argued, more shrilly, that the book had 'fanned the flames of a 
new wave of anti-German sentiment'. For such critical observers, the belief that 
Shirer's work was influencing the views of hundreds of thousands of American 
readers was extremely worrisome. Such concerns reached as high up as Federal 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who attacked Shirer as a 'German-hater' and argued 
that his book was 'extremely harrnful to German?American relations'. As part of a 
larger effort at public relations damage-control, the Bonn government took the 
unusual step in late 1961 of compiling a twenty-four page pamphlet of negative 
reviews of the book and distributing it to numerous American newspaper editors 
and book reviewers. Still, some German reviewers conceded that the damage had 
already been done. Although it had been widely hoped that Americans had 
forgotten about the Federal Republic's Nazi past over the course of the two nations' 
postwar anti-communist alliance, the book's success made clear, 
as one observer in 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung pointed out, that 'a good many people, even in 
allied states, have not forgotten'.11 
What was the ultimate significance of the international furor surrounding The 
Rise and Fall of the Third Reich?. In terms of scholarship on the Nazi period, the book 
had little immediate impact. Most German historians in the early 1960s were not 
prepared, in the first place, to heed Shirer's implicit call to redirect their focus away 
from the concept of totalitarianism and towards the deeper German roots of 
Nazism. Any debate that might have ensued between Shirer and his German critics 
was forestalled, moreover, when he cancelled his planned tour of the country after 
being informed that he would probably face numerous lawsuits once he entered 
German territory.12 And yet, even though the direct scholarly impact of Shirer's 
book was minimal, it was instrumental in reviving popular attention towards a 
period of history that had been gradually marginalised in memory. Since the late 
1940s and throughout the decade of the 1950s, the concerns of most Americans and 
Germans understandably had been dominated less by Nazis than by communists. 
The publication of Shirer's book, aided by renewed international attention towards 
Germany's Nazi past and geopolitical present, however, altered this state of affairs 
for good. Indeed, in West Germany, the growing recognition of the widespread 
11 
Ibid., pp. 102-3, 118-20. 
12 William L. Shirer, Twentieth Century Journey: A Native's Return, 1945-1988 (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1990), 440. Manuscripts Department, Lilly Library, Indiana University/Epstein mss 
(MDLLIU/Em), letter from William Shirer to Fritz Epstein, 21 Sep. 1961. 
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interest in the Third Reich together with the increasing frustration that 
- as the 
S?ddeutsche Zeitung noted 
- 'we allow the great subject of our history 
... to be 
taken away from us by foreigners', gradually prompted German historians to take a 
new, self-critical look at their own history. As the historiographical turn of the 
1960s would reveal (beginning with the vigorous German debate over Fritz Fischer's 
book, Griff nach der Weltmacht, in 1964, and followed by the study of the German 
Sonderweg), a new generation of German historians increasingly began to identify 
distinct lines of continuity between the Third Reich and previous eras of the 
German past. That historians increasingly began to approach Shirer's own position 
(albeit in a far more sophisticated and nuanced manner) attests to his indirect role in 
promoting the long German struggle to 'come to terms' with the Nazi past (known 
in German as Vergangenheitsbew?ltigung). Although Shirer as an outsider was unable to 
topple the reigning views of German history, the impact of his book rendered them 
vulnerable and ultimately led them to be challenged by the Germans themselves. 
Shirer's contribution to this process of confronting the past, however, has 
generally been ignored. He himself remained a tragic figure of sorts. Frustrated by 
the lack of respect granted him in Germany, he did not return to the country until 
1985, at which point the controversy over US President Ronald Reagan's visit to 
the Bitburg military cemetery left him newly pessimistic about the future. Only 
gradually did German historians come to recognise the value of Shirer's work and 
understand the reasons for the widespread resistance to The Rise and Fall of the Third 
Reich within their country in the early 1960s.13 Today, however, his reputation has 
been belatedly restored. When he died in late 1992, Shirer was remembered by one 
of the leading German historians of the Nazi period, Hans Mommsen, as a 'brilliant 
observer of German affairs'.14 In this sense, his view of German history 
can be seen 
as having been somewhat ahead of its time. 
Whether or not the same can be said about Daniel J. Goldhagen's book can be 
answered, in part, by comparing the debate sparked by Hitler's Willing Executioners to 
that caused by Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Numerous similarities can 
be noted between the two books. Both were highly provocative, offering similar 
theses that diverged from the scholarly consensus of the times. In the same way, for 
example, that Shirer aimed 
to redirect attention towards the German roots of (and 
the German people's support for) National Socialism and the Third Reich, Gold 
hagen stressed the German dimensions of the Holocaust. Both books, indeed, 
advocated differing versions of the 'Luther to Hitler' view of German history, 
seeking the causes of the Nazi disaster in a specifically deviant German national 
context rather than in factors typical of broader European or modern developments. 
As is by now well known, Goldhagen adamantly rejected explaining the Holocaust 
according to any theories that possess universalistic implications, be they coercion, 
obedience, peer pressure, bureaucratic indifference, or the fragmented nature of 
13 Volker Ullrich, 'Die schreckliche Wildnis Deutschland', Die Zeit, 18 Mar. 1994, 17-18. 
14 Hans Mommsen, 'Schl?ssel zur Gewaltherrschaft', Die S?ddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), 30 Dec. 
1993, 10. 
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decision-making.15 Instead, he focuses insistently upon the role of a deep-rooted 
German tradition of anti-Semitism. 'The conclusion of this book', Goldhagen states, 
'is that anti-Semitism moved . . . ordinary Germans 
... to 
slaughter Jews'; 
'Germans' anti-Semitic beliefs . . . were the central causal agent of the Holocaust.'16 
In the same way that Shirer abandoned complicated, ideal-typical theoretical 
constructs such as totalitarianism to explain the genesis and functioning of the Nazi 
state in favour of an argument of national particularity, Goldhagen rejects more 
theoretical explanations in favour of 
a view that centred on an onerous 'elimina 
tionist' anti-Semitism present in Germany since the early nineteenth century. 
Needless to say, such a view, emphasising continuity rather than rupture, teleology 
rather than contingency, is highly controversial, yet understandably popular in its 
simplicity and surface logic. 
Indeed, Goldhagen's simple explanation for the Holocaust in Hitler's Willing 
Executioners no doubt contributed substantially to the book's swift attainment of 
bestseller status. In the United States, it was first on the bestseller list of Publisher's 
Weekly in April and remained near the bottom of the top fifteen hardback non 
fiction sellers nationwide for almost three months until June, after which time it 
dropped off the list altogether.17 Compared to Shirer's impressive year-and-a-half 
run on the American bestseller list in 1960?61, this showing was quite modest. Yet, 
in Germany, the sales of Goldhagen's book were more noteworthy. The book sold 
out its first printing of 40,000 in a week, a number that doubled within the 
subsequent three weeks.18 Over 
two years since its appearance in Germany, the 
book has sold well over 100,000 copies and has been 
a constant presence on Der 
Spiegel's bestseller list. The commercial success of Hitler's Willing Executioners in 
Germany thus substantially surpassed that of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich in 
1961-62. 
Far more notable than the sales of Goldhagen's book, of course, 
was the media 
frenzy surrounding it. Although quickly subjected to withering criticism, Hitler's 
Willing Executioners was initially greeted with considerable media attention and 
acclaim in the United States. Some portion of this phenomenon was the result of 
relentless promotion. In contrast to Shirer, who 
was rather modest about the virtues 
of his book, Goldhagen emphatically asserted the originality, innovativeness, and 
importance of his study.19 Marketing hype also contributed to the early success of 
15 These general theories have been advanced by Christopher Browning in his study, Ordinary 
Men (New York; Harperperennial, 1992), a book which Goldhagen uses as a foil for his own work. 
Much of Goldhagen's critique of Browning takes place in the footnotes of Hitler's Willing Executioners. 
16 Daniel J. Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), 9. 
17 
By way of comparison, Goldhagen's book was on the New York Times Book Review's bestseller 
list for a total of eleven weeks in 1996, from April to the end of June. 
18 
'Goldhagen Sells Out in Germany', Forward, 23 Aug. 1996; since early September 1996, the 
book has stood as high as number two on Der Spiegel's bestseller list. 
19 
Shirer, for example, noted in the foreword to his book that 'I found it extremely difficult and 
not always possible to learn the exact truth about Hitler's Germany'. William L. Shirer, The Rise and 
Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster, i960), xi. He also modestly conceded that his 
'interpretations 
. . . will be disputed by many' (p. xii). 
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Hitler's Willing Executioners. The book's publisher Alfred A. Knopf organised a 
shrewd and predictably glitzy campaign on behalf of the book, touting it as 'an 
explosive historical work of the utmost originality and importance that will radically 
transform our understanding of the Holocaust and of Nazi Germany'. Such 
hyperbolic praise, to be sure, also surrounded The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 
whose publisher, Simon and Schuster, heralded it in i960 as 'one of the most 
important stories ever told' and possibly 'the definitive history of one of the greatest 
and most frightening chapters in the history of mankind'. Puffs of this kind are 
understandable from publishing firms whose primary business is to sell books. Yet, 
as frequently happens in the world of publishing, the line between hype and critical 
praise seems to have been blurred in the case of Hitler's Willing Executioners. The 
glowing mini-reviews written by Stanley Hoffman and Simon Schama and 
distributed by Knopf in its advance publicity for the book may be of doubtful 
validity, given that neither scholar (though well-respected in his respective field) is 
an acknowledged expert in the area of Holocaust studies.20 Other positive reviews 
of the book also must be evaluated in light of their authors' lack of scholarly 
expertise in the field. The grandiose claims of journalists, for example, that Hitler's 
Willing Executioners was 'the most important book ever published about the 
Holocaust', that it would 'revolutionise Holocaust studies', that it was 'historic' and 
'masterly', seem to be driven more by the dynamics of our present-day, blurbocratic 
mass media than by any careful consideration of the book's merits and flaws.21 
The praise for Hitler's Willing Executioners, indeed, has thus far been significantly 
outweighed by the avalanche of criticism that has been directed towards it. Unlike 
The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, over which American and German reviewers 
divided sharply, the negative response to Goldhagen's study among American and 
German reviewers, journalists 
as well as historians, has been remarkably consistent.22 
Much of the criticism has been harsh. In countless review articles and, more 
recently, entire books, American critics have dismissed Hitler's Willing Executioners as 
'unoriginal', 'simplistic', 'reductionistic' and 'mechanistic', and have accused Gold 
20 Hoffmann gave the book a positive review, calling it 'overwhelming and devastating', in Foreign 
Affairs, May/June 1996, 144. Fritz Stern and Raul Hilberg cite the importance of promotional hype for 
the book's success. See Fritz Stern, 'The Goldhagen Controversy', Foreign Affairs, November/December 
!996, 138; and Raul Hilberg, 'The Goldhagen Phenomenon', Critical Inquiry, Summer 1997, 721-8. 
21 See New York Times advertisement for the book, 4 April 1996, B5. A. M. Rosenthal praised the 
book in his brief essay, 'Some Ordinary Germans', The New York Times, 2 Apr. 1996. Robert Andersen 
calls the book 'brilliant' in 'Extraordinary Evil: New Look at the Holocaust Finds the Answer to 
"Why?" Buried Deep in a Nation's Soul', Chicago Tribune, 21 April 1996. See also Jack Schwartz's 
positive review in Newsday, 24 Mar. 1996. The positive review by Elie Wiesel, one of the most 
recognisable public figure associated with the Holocaust, represents an exception to the trend of 
ebullient reviews by non-experts. Wiesel, however, stops short of crediting Goldhagen with explaining 
the Holocaust, an event which for him remains 'unexplainable'. Wiesel's review can be found in Julius 
H. Schoeps (ed.), Ein Volk pon M?rdern? Die Dokumentation zur Goldhagen-Kontroverse um die Rolle der 
Deutschen im Holocaust (Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe, 1996), 44-7. 
22 A collection of reviews, entitled Ein Volk von M?rdern? Die Dokumentation zur Goldhagen 
Kontroverse um die Rolle der Deutschen im Holocaust and edited by Julius H. Schoeps (Hamburg: Hoffman 
& Campe, 1996), contains many of the important German reviews but is more sparse in its selection of 
American reviews. 
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hagen of selectively using archival sources in a 'biased' manner, of 'hyping the 
Holocaust', and (least plausibly) of being an 'holocaust ideologue' who has depicted 
the Holocaust through an 'ultra-Zionist lens' in order to promote the political 
agenda of the 'Holocaust Studies Industry'.23 Like their American colleagues, most 
German critics, especially early on, 
were 
extremely 
severe in their treatment of 
Goldhagen's study, attacking it as 'an awful book' of 'minimal value' that 'proves 
nothing'.24 More charitable reviewers in both countries, while recognising that 
Hitler's Willing Executioners is, in fact, a serious study of some of the perpetrators of 
the Holocaust, have cast doubt upon its hubristic claim to have overturned reigning 
conceptions of the Holocaust with a radically original thesis.25 To a certain extent, 
the sharply negative tone of the American reviews of Hitler's Willing Executioners can 
be attributed to the fact that Goldhagen has gained considerable commercial success 
as a disciplinary outsider; like Shirer, who achieved great success as a journalist, 
Goldhagen is a political scientist who has entered a field largely populated by 
historians (whom he has understandably angered by challenging their work). Unlike 
23 Criticisms of the book's claim to originality can be found in the following reviews: Berei Lang, 
'The Blame Game', Moment, August 1996, 86; Robert Wistrich, 'Helping Hitler', Commentary, July 
1996, 30; Omer Bartov, 'Ordinary Monsters', The New Republic, 29 Apr. 1996, 34; Gordon A. Craig, 
'How Hell Worked', The New York Review of Books, 18 Apr. 1996, 4, 7; David Schoenbaum, 'Ordinary 
People?' National Review, 1 Jul. 1996, 55; Yehuda Bauer, 'Why the Germans?', Humanistic Judaism, 
Summer 1996, 36-9; Henry Friedlander, 'Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners', 
German Studies Review, 3, October 1996, 578; and Stern, 'The Goldhagen Controversy', 129. The book 
has been deemed 'simplistic' by Nomi Morris, 'Owning up to evil', MacLean's, 3 Jun. 1996, 59, 
'reductionist' by Jeremy D. Noakes, 'No ordinary People', Times Literary Supplement, 7 Jun. 1996, 10, 
and 'mechanistic' by Stephen Aschheim in 'Reconceiving the Holocaust?' Tikkun, 11, 4 (1996), 64. 
Ruth Bettina Birn was among the most direct in criticising Goldhagen for allowing his thesis to dictate 
the presentation of his evidence, Ruth Bettina Birn, 'Revising the Holocaust', The Historical Journal, 1 
(I997)> 195?215. For more on the theme of hype, see Franklin H. Littell (ed.), Hyping the Holocaust: 
Scholars Answer Goldhagen (East Rockaway, N.Y.: Cummings and Hathaway, 1997). The accusation that 
Goldhagen was a Zionist ideologue surfaced in two extremely critical essays by Norman Finkelstein 
which, while offering substantive criticisms of Goldhagen's work, concluded with wildly polemical and 
unfair speculations Goldhagen's putative role as the chief representative of the (allegedly) politically 
driven and scholarly worthless field of'Holocaust studies'. Revealingly, Finkelstein declined to identify 
any representatives of this scholarly field, leaving one little choice but to regard it as a straw man 
argument, perfectly suited for him to topple as a means of promoting his own political agenda: Norman 
Finkelstein, 'Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's "Crazy" Thesis: A Critique of Hitler's Willing Executioners', New 
Left Review, July/August 1997, 39-87. Norman Finkelstein and Ruth Bettina Birn, A Nation on Trial: 
The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth (New York: Henry Holt, 1998). 
24 Eberhard J?ckel, 'Einfach ein schlechtes Buch', Die Zeit, 17 May 1996, 15; Norbert Frei, 'Ein 
Volk von Endlosem?' SZ, 13/14 Apr. 1996, 13; Frank Schirrmacher, 'Hitlers Code', FAZ, 15 Apr. 
1996, 31. For another scathing review see Rudolf Augstein, 'Der Soziologe als Scharfrichter', Der 
Spiegel, 16 (1996), 29-30. 
25 More moderately critical reviews include John Elson, 'What Did They Know?', Time, 1 Apr. 
1996; Volker Berghahn, 'The Road to Extermination', The New York Times Book Review, 14 Apr. 1996, 
6-7; and Dietrich Orlow, 'The Roots of Nazism', The Boston Globe, 24 Mar. 1996, B36. In a similar 
vein, Josef Joffe has written several ambiguous reviews of the book, calling it 'a brilliant contribution', 
on the one hand, yet asserting that Goldhagen's basic premise 'crumbles' in the light of countervailing 
evidence. See Josef Joffe, 'Goldhagen in Germany', The New York Review of Books, 28 Nov. 1996 as well 
as 'Hitlers willf?hrige Henker', Die S?ddeutsche Zeitung, 13/14 Apr. 1996, 13. One of the more well 
balanced and thorough German reviews of the book is Dieter Pohl's 'Die Holocaust-Forschung und 
Goldhagen's Thesen', Vierteljahrshefte f?r Zeitgeschichte, 1 (January 1997), 1-49. 
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The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, however, which is regarded as a relatively solid 
(if now largely outdated) work, the critics of Hitler's Willing Executioners have shown 
it to be marred by a litany of serious analytical and methodological shortcomings. As 
such, it fails to realise its stated ambition to be 'a radical revision of what has until 
now been written'.26 Goldhagen's explanation of the Holocaust is, in fact, not new; 
where it is new, moreover, it does not fully explain the Holocaust. In surveying the 
critical reaction to the book in the United States and Germany, therefore, one 
inevitably is forced to raise questions about the qualitative nature of the Goldhagen 
Controversy' itself. 
Nearly all reviewers have pointed out the shortcomings of Goldhagen's discussion 
of German anti-Semitism. Eager to demonstrate the existence of a nearly universal 
anti-Semitism among the German people, Goldhagen downplayed evidence to the 
contrary, identifying seamless continuities in place of a highly differentiated historical 
reality. His view of the pervasiveness of a uniquely pernicious 'eliminationist' anti 
Semitism cannot account, first of all, for the fact that, as a result of the (admittedly 
slow) process of emancipation and assimilation, Jews not only rose to positions of 
preeminence in German cultural, intellectual and political life throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries but frequently intermarried with Christians or 
were accepted as converts to Christianity.27 Goldhagen has also been criticised for 
exaggerating the extent and severity of anti-Semitism in nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century Germany. His erroneous claim that antisemitic political parties 
enjoyed a majority in the Reichstag and his dilution of the political power of the 
Social Democrats (SPD, whose leader, August Bebel, had famously decried anti 
Semitism as the 'socialism of fools') have been pointed out, as has his conflation of 
racial anti-Semitism (which enjoyed more of a fringe status) and the more common 
non-racial forms of anti-Semitism.28 Despite his elaborate theoretical arguments to 
the contrary, Goldhagen's view of anti-Semitism seems to be largely ahistorical; he 
devoted little attention, for example, to the radicalising impact that the loss of the 
First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution had on the qualitative nature and 
26 
Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners, 9. 
27 See Clive James, 'Blaming the Germans', The New Yorker, 22 Apr. 1996, 49; 'If all were guilty, 
none were', Economist, 27 Apr. 1996, 91; Wistrich, 'Helping Hider', 30. Steven Aschheim points out 
that intermarriage rates were above 10-13% before 1914 and double that in Weimar. Aschheim, 
'Reconceiving the Holocaust?', 63. Such facts do not accord well, to say the least, with Goldhagen's 
assertion that 'the vast majority of Germans had little or no contact with Jews'. Goldhagen, Hitler's 
Willing Executioners, 78. For if this many Germans and Jews were intermarrying, many more were 
clearly acquainted. German critics likewise stressed the integration of Jews in pre-Nazi Germany. 'Ein 
Volk von D?monen?' Der Spiegel, 21 (1996), 60-4, Heinrich Jaenecke, 'Die Deutschen: ein Volk von 
Antisemiten?' Stern, 30 (1996), 130. See also letter to the editor by Marion Gr?fin D?nhoff, The New 
York Review of Books, 23 May 1996, 52. 
28 On the composition of the Reichstag and the strength of the SPD see Wistrich, 'Helping 
Hitler', 29; Noakes, 'No ordinary People', 9; Aschheim, 'Reconceiving the Holocaust?', 63, Ulrich 
Herbert, 'Aus der Mitte der Gesellschaft,' Die Zeit, 14 Jun. 1996, 5; Gordon Craig, letter to the editor, 
The New York Review of Books, 23 May 1996, 52. Goldhagen's undifferentiated use of anti-Semitism is 
discussed by Christopher Browning, 'Daniel Goldhagen's Willing Executioners', History and Memory, 
97-8; Robert Leicht, 'Warum der Streit um die Studie sich lohnt', Die Zeit, 6 Sep. 1996. For a general 
critique see Hans Mommsen, 'Die d?nne Patina der Zivilisation', Die Zeit, 30 Aug. 1996, 14-15. 
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quantitative spread of anti-Semitism in Weimar Germany, seeing such developments 
as a mere 
adjustment of 
a 
long extant eliminationist model.29 
Beyond the realm of German history itself, Goldhagen's view of anti-Semitism 
has been censured for a lack of comparative perspective. This is a crucial omission, 
given Goldhagen's emphasis 
on the uniqueness of German anti-Semitism 
? a 
quality 
that can only be demonstrated through an approach that is comparative in nature. 
So singular does Goldhagen view the pervasiveness and perniciousness of elimina 
tionist anti-Semitism in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany to be that he 
claims that the nation had 'a radically different culture', 
was not 'normal', and 
should not be seen as 'more or less like us'; rather, German culture must be viewed 
in the same way that 'an anthropologist, disembarking 
on unknown shores', would 
examine an exotic, foreign people.30 As many reviewers have pointed out, 
however, France during the Dreyfus Affair, Russia under the tsars, and Austria in 
the era of Lueger and Sch?nerer experienced far more antisemitic violence than 
Wilhelmine Germany ever did.31 To this list should be added the quantum leap in 
antisemitic violence during and after the First World War, in which an estimated 
250,000 Jews (identified frequently as traitorous Bolsheviks) were massacred in 
bloody pogroms and mass executions by Ukranians, Russians and Poles. In short, 
although Goldhagen identified a qualitatively more severe brand of anti-Semitism in 
Germany, his view is contradicted by the sorry evidence supplied by Germany's 
neighbours. 
In addition to attacking Goldhagen's view of German anti-Semitism, his 
numerous critics have questioned his analysis of its specific role in motivating 
the German perpetrators of the Holocaust. Various reviewers have questioned 
Goldhagen's seeming diminution of the role played by the dictatorial Nazi system 
itself? in particular, his failure 
to address the role of the state propaganda apparatus 
in sanctioning and encouraging latent hatreds, his underestimation of the effective 
ness of the police state in silencing critics of antisemitic actions, and, above all, his 
blurring of the substantial difference in antisemitic attitudes held by the fanatical 
Nazi leadership on the one hand and the broader German citizenry on the other.32 
29 
Wistrich, 'Helping Hitler', 29; Stern, 'The Goldhagen Controversy', 131. Other examples of 
Goldhagen's ahistorical, undifferentiated exaggerations include his claims that 'conservatives and 
Volkisch nationalists . . . formed the vast majority of the population' (when? and what of the working 
class?), that 'the ubiquitous anti-Semitism that existed in 1800 and in 1850 [eras, by the way, before the 
term was even coined] became 
. . . more intense and . . . deadly as the century was drawing to a close' 
(a claim refuted by the decline in political anti-Semitism at this time), and that 'racial anti-Semitism was 
the salient form of anti-Semitism in Germany' (when, he does not specify). Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing 
Executioners, 56, 74. 
30 
Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners, 15, 27. Goldhagen concludes: 'German anti-Semitism 
was sui generis'. Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners, 419. 
31 
Schoenbaum, 'Ordinary People?', 55; Wistrich, 'Helping Hitler', 29; Noakes, 'No Ordinary 
People', 9; Stern, 'The Goldhagen Controversy', 129; Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 'Wie ein Stachel im 
Fleisch', Die Zeit, 24 May 1996, 40. 
32 On the differences between the anti-Semitism of the Nazi leadership and the masses see 
Wistrich, 'Helping Hitler', 30, Noakes, 'No Ordinary People', 9. A particular glaring example is his 
(unprovable) claim that 'a near universal acceptance of the central aspects of the Nazi image of Jews 
characterised the German people'. Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners, 442. On the role of incessant 
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Moreover, some have criticised Goldhagen's failure to contextualise the Holocaust 
within the Nazis' overall plan for a racial utopia, from which Slavs, Gypsies, and the 
handicapped 
? in addition to Jews 
- were to be violently excluded.33 Still others 
have refuted Goldhagen's assertions of the broad-based approval of the Holocaust 
among the German population by stressing the regime's desire to maintain a veil of 
secrecy around its worst crimes, citing, in particular, Heinrich Himmler's notorious 
speech to the SS in Posen on 4 October 1943 in which he referred to the Holocaust 
as 'the most glorious page in 
our 
history 
. . . which shall never be written'.34 
Beyond objections to Goldhagen's reading of the history of Nazi Germany, many 
have cited the absence of a comparative framework for analysing the specific role of 
anti-Semitism in the crimes of the Holocaust. Some, for example, have shown that 
hatred was not a necessary criterion for mass killings; Christopher Browning, for 
example, argued that the participation of thirteen members of Police Battalion 101 
from Luxemburg in the killing of Jews could not have been the result of a German 
brand of anti-Semitism.35 Other massacres during the Second World War reveal the 
relative insignificance of hatred as a primary motive for murder: the cold-blooded 
execution of over 21,000 Polish officers by Soviet troops (who were presumably not 
consumed by hatred, yet nevertheless proceeded to kill their defenceless prisoners) 
in the Katyn forest and at other sites in 1940, 
as well as the notorious massacres 
committed against non-Jews by German army and SS units at Oradour (French), 
Malm?dy (Americans), Lidice (Czechs), and the Ardeatine caves (Italians). Other 
critics have argued that hatred was not solely a German affair, pointing to other 
Europeans who were just as antisemitic as Germans and were able to kill Jews en 
masse and in cold blood. Significant numbers of Lithuanians, Latvians, Ukrainians, 
and Romanians distinguished themselves during the Second World War for their 
participation in bloody massacres of Jews.36 If, as Goldhagen insists, the Germans 
were not 'normal' because of their anti-Semitism, then neither were these other 
peoples 
? 
a fact which ultimately invalidates any assertion of German uniqueness. 
Indeed, in sharing such company with other nations' willing executioners, the 
Germans must be seen either as not so unlike everyone else or as part of a larger 
collective of 'uniquely' abnormal peoples 
? an 
oxymoronical concept that calls into 
antisemitic propaganda under the Nazis see Bartov, 'Ordinary Monsters', 35; Jaenecke, 'Die Deutschen', 
131; on Nazi repression of dissident opinion, see James, 'Blaming the Germans', 47-8 and 'Ein Volk 
von D?monen?' 77. 
33 
James, 'Blaming the Germans', 50; Wehler, 'Wie en Stachel', 40; Aschheim, 'Reconceiving the 
Holocaust?' 64-5; In his article 'Hitler's Willing Executioners: Privileging Jewish Lives, Privileging 
Antisemitism', Jonathan P?trie reminds readers that the Nazis killed millions of Polish civilians and 
Russian POWs. In The Genocide Forum, June 1996, 2-3. 
34 
Noakes, 'No Ordinary People', 10; 'Ein Volk von D?monen?' 52, 76-7; Aschheim, 'Recon 
ceiving the Holocaust?' 63; James, 'Blaming the Germans', 47; Himmler's words are cited in Saul 
Friedlander, Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 1993), 105. 
35 
Browning, 'Goldhagen's Willing Executioners', 94-6. 
36 
Wehler, 'Wie ein Stachel', 40; J?ckel, 'Einfach ein schlechtes Buch', 15; Joffe, 'Hitlers 
willf?hrige Henker', David Cesarani, 'Hitler's Willing Executioners', New Statesman and Society, 15 Apr. 
1996; 'If all were guilty, none were', Economist, 91. 
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question the very idea of normalcy. Finally, the occurrence of so many other 
episodes of mass murder in the twentieth century 
- the Armenians massacred by the 
Turks, the victims of the Stalinist purges, of Maoist revolutionary violence, of Pol 
Pot and the Khmer Rouge, of mutual Hutu and Tutsi antagonisms, and of the 
Yugoslav civil 
war ? also suggests that other factors, rooted in the nebulous concept 
of modernity, must be at work besides simple hatred which, after all, has regrettably 
been in existence for many centuries prior to this one.37 
Yet, even apart from the trenchant critiques of Goldhagen's analysis of anti 
Semitism and its contribution to mass murder, his book falls short of its claim to 
have revised fundamentally our understanding of the Holocaust by neglecting its 
unique feature: the gas chambers.38 Having noted at the outset of Hitler's Willing 
Executioners that the surfeit of scholarly analysis on the gas chambers justifies omitting 
them from his analysis, Goldhagen marginalises their importance throughout the 
book, calling them 'epiphenomenaT and 'not an essential development' in the 
overall German plan of killing Jews, which would have continued even without 
their invention.39 This counterfactual hypothesis is, of course, invalidated by the 
historical record. The Germans did invent the gas chambers and for a reason: to 
make their genocidal campaign both more efficient and less psychologically taxing 
for the perpetrators.40 Goldhagen notes this latter point but does not seem to see 
how it contradicts his belief that Germans killed willingly, eagerly, and viciously. 
For developing the gas chambers 
? a means of killing that minimised contact 
between victim and perpetrator 
? should not have been necessary for a people 
thirsting to kill Jews en masse. The unrestrained, often sadistic violence that 
characterised mass shootings 
or death marches was not evident at gassings, which 
was a comparatively controlled process that distanced the killers from the victims. 
Rooted in the subterfuges of deception rather than the outright brutalities of sadism 
(most victims, told they were entering showers, did not know what fate awaited 
them) the gas chambers were part of a mechanised, industrialised, bureaucratically 
37 
James, 'Blaming the Germans', 50; Wehler, 'Wie ein Stachel', 40; Browning, 'Goldhagen's 
Willing Executioners', 101-2; Peter Glotz, 'Nation der Killer', in Schoeps, Ein Volk von Modern? 
128-9; R- C. Longworth, 'Germans' Role in Holocaust Unique? History Says Not', Chicago Tribune, 
21 Apr. 1996. 
38 
Although not mentioning the gas chambers as such, Robert Wistrich is one of the very few 
critics who has pointed out how Goldhagen's analysis detracts from the unique features of the 
Holocaust. Wistrich, 'Helping Hitler', 31. See also Hans Mommsen's similar remarks in: 'Im 
R?derwerk', FAZ, 7 Sep. 1996, 37. 
39 
Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners, 10, 157, 165, 523 n4, 521 n8i. Goldhagen emphasises 
the quantitative rather than than the qualitative dimensions of the gas chambers. For example, he 
compares the numbers of Jews killed in shootings with those gassed (40% of the total) as if quantitative 
similarity is the same as qualitative. Similarly, he contests the 'efficiency' of the gas chambers, as if their 
quantitative results were as qualitatively notable as their very employment. Moreover, he attempts to 
elide the difference between extermination camps and 'work' camps by citing the horrifically high 
death rates in the latter (Goldhagen, 173). While an important observation, it reduces the uniqueness of 
the extermination camps. After all, in the Soviet Union under Stalin, work camps with very high 
mortality rates also existed. 
40 See Uwe Dietrich Adam, 'The Gas Chambers', in Francois Furet, Unanswered Questions: Nazi 
Germany and the Genocide of the Jews (New York: Schocken Books, 1989), 84-96. 
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organised process of killing that was implemented by individuals (whether govern 
ment bureaucrats who tallied deportation statistics, railroad officials who operated 
the trains, industrialists who shipped the materials for the gas chambers and ovens, 
or architects who designed them) who embodied the banality of evil far more 
deeply than, say, the members of Police Battalion 101. That Goldhagen has shifted 
the focus away from such individuals to other perpetrators is to be welcomed as a 
means of broadening our understanding of those who were the agents of the 
Holocaust. But he cannot separate out the gas chambers and, at the same time, claim 
to have uncovered the missing piece to the larger puzzle of the Holocaust. The 
shootings that he so harrowingly recounts do not by themselves represent the 
historical caesura that the gas chambers do. As a means of mass killing, shootings 
were hardly unprecedented and represented merely the expansion of a proven 
method of murder. Any explanation of the shootings, no matter how convincing, 
cannot explain the Holocaust in toto, for such horrific actions did not constitute its 
new or unique feature. The uniqueness of the Holocaust 
- 
namely, the centralised, 
rationalised, and bureaucratically organised state decision to kill the Jewish people in 
its entirety 
- found its clearest and most efficient expression in the gas chambers. It 
is no wonder then that a much denser (if not fully opaque) veil of secrecy 
surrounded them than the far more public mass shootings outside eastern European 
towns and villages.41 As the unprecedented means of murder embodying the 
uniquely criminal ends of the Nazis, the gas chambers remain the singular feature of 
the Holocaust. Their thoroughly marginalised place in Hitler's Willing Executioners 
necessarily prevents Goldhagen's book from realising its most ambitious aims. 
The many substantive attacks directed against Hitler's Willing Executioners, in turn, 
raise questions about its commercial success. How has a book that has attracted so 
much substantial criticism become a bestseller? It would not seem to be on the 
basis of pathbreaking scholarship. Although Goldhagen has a positive contribution 
to the larger field of Holocaust studies through his empirical case studies of Order 
Police killings, 'work' camps, and death marches, his book falls short of its eye 
catching claim 
to overturn all that has preceded it. It is therefore reasonable to 
conclude that factors other than those usually associated with historiographical 
controversy, such as truly innovative scholarship, 
are at work. One likely 
reason for 
the commercial success of Hitler's Willing Executioners (especially in the United 
States) was the immediate hostile reaction to it in Germany. While advancing 
many of the same criticisms of Hitler's Willing Executioners as American reviewers, 
many German reviewers adopted a harsher tone, which revealed particular German 
problems with the book. The levelling of unsavoury ad hominem attacks against 
Goldhagen, some of which gratuitously raised the issue of the author's Jewish 
identity, for example, have justifiably been seen as reflecting lingering anti-Jewish 
attitudes in Germany.42 Such attacks, which generally questioned Goldhagen's 
41 'Ein Volk von D?monen?' 77. 
42 Andrei S. Markovits details the ad hominem attacks against Goldhagen in 'St?rfall im Endlager 
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personal motives and scholarly credentials for writing the book, seemed to be 
triggered by feelings of defensiveness and resentment and reflected deep-seated 
German anxieties about their nation's international image. These factors help to 
explain why Hitler's Willing Executioners was attacked as 'racist' and also why 
Goldhagen was condemned for allegedly reviving the concept of 'collective guilt' 
and acting like a Nuremberg prosecutor who was 'placing the whole [German] 
people on trial'.43 To a notable degree, such prickly retorts were rooted in political 
fears, especially the concern that the book's commercial success in the United 
States reflected American unease over German reunification. As one critic 
concluded, 'whoever believes the 
. . . book can only view the Germans' path into 
the twenty-first century with scepticism and fear'.44 Such anxious German reactions 
to the book, in turn, drew still further attention to it in the United States. The 
mounting German criticism of Goldhagen, indeed, quickly generated an aura of 
international controversy and created a sensational buzz that no doubt helped to 
boost the American sales of the book. Paradoxically, therefore, the hostile reaction 
of certain German critics to Hitler's Willing Executioners undermined their very goal 
of downplaying its importance. 
German fears notwithstanding, however, it does not appear that larger political 
factors have been very important in shaping the reception of Hitler's Willing 
Executioners. To be sure, ever since the early postwar period when Konrad Adenauer 
led a determined campaign to secure Germany's readmission to the community of 
'civilised' nations, sensitivity to the German image abroad has been a constituent 
feature of German national identity. Such sensitivity has not been baseless, more 
over, for at various times in the history of the Federal Republic, certain nations 
have, in fact, expressed deep misgivings about developments in Germany. And yet, 
German apprehension that similar misgivings 
- 
in this case, over reunification 
? 
were behind the success of Goldhagen's book seem misplaced. Whatever fears were 
initially voiced in 1989?90 about reunification have proven to be unfounded today. 
Right-wing and neo-Nazi violence directed against foreigners has been 
a matter of 
grave concern, yet Germany has shown 
no 
signs of evolving into the aggressive, 
expansionist power anticipated by some. Instead, it has remained a stable and 
prosperous democracy, even while pursuing the difficult task of integrating the 
former communist East Germany. Especially compared with the far more highly 
charged political context of 1960-61 that helped make The Rise and Fall of the Third 
Reich so controversial (the neo-Nazi vandalism of 1959-60, the Eichmann trial, the 
der Geschichte', in Ein Volk von M?rdern? Schoeps, 228-40. Such ill-considered attacks seems to have 
led certain observers such as Marko vits and Josef Joffe to defend Goldhagen not so much for scholarly as 
for moral and political reasons. Yet, while such attacks deserved to be criticised, their significance 
should not be overestimated. Goldhagen's attempt to exploit the ad hominem attacks against him as 
evidence of his position's correctness should not distract from the fact that most of his critics have been 
fair and have largely focused on the shortcomings of his analysis. 
43 
Wehler, 'Wie ein Stachel', 14; Schirrmacher, 'Hitlers Code', 31; 'Ein Volk von D?monen?' 58, 
72. Jost Nolte referred to the book as 'racist' in: 'Sisyphus ist Deutscher'. Marion Gr?fin D?nhoff also 
played the race card in 'Warum D. J. Goldhagens Buch in die Irre f?hrt', Die Zeit, 6 Sep. 1996. 
44 
Schirrmacher, 'Hitlers Code', 31. 
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Berlin crisis), there seem to be fewer larger political reasons today to explain why 
Goldhagen's book has caused such a stir. Indeed, while Adenauer took action to 
limit the influence of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, the closest Hitler's Willing 
Executioners came to producing such an effect was the then German Foreign Minister 
Klaus Kinkel's briefly stated objection to the concept of collective guilt in a 
Washington DC speech to a Jewish group 
- a remark made without mentioning 
Goldhagen's book by name.45 Since it is apparent that Hitler's Willing Executioners 
has not become controversial for larger political reasons, the 
sources of its sudden 
fame must lie elsewhere. 
To an important degree, Hitler's Willing Executioners has gained its stature through 
a mixture of promotion, sensationalism, and media hype. Indeed, both German and 
American critics have noted such factors in analysing the reasons for the book's 
success. Echoing the views of many, the historian Norbert Frei noted that to obtain 
commercial success in the 'competitive media market', books need 'explosive 
theses' and the sort of provocative stance that Hitler's Willing Executioners seems to 
have.46 The monocausality, drastic simplification, and moralising tone of his 
analysis, others have argued, not only allowed Goldhagen to challenge more 
nuanced scholarship, but have ensured him a wide popular audience.47 Most lay 
readers, unfamiliar with the complexity of the subject, find such simple explanations 
appealing. In presenting such simple arguments, moreover, Goldhagen has been 
seen by German critics as having shrewdly exploited 'deep-rooted resentments and 
prejudices' of'sections of the American public'.48 Similar arguments were made, it 
should be noted, about The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, which was also seen at 
the time of its publication as having exploited American fascination with the Nazi 
era and prejudices against the Germans.49 Beyond its appeal to a lingering fascination 
with the Nazi era, Hitler's Willing Executioners has tapped into a current obsession 
with killers, whether serial, celebrity, or cinematic. Although its narrative is rooted 
in a clear moral framework, a book that focuses upon the perpetrators and includes 
extended graphic depictions of mass murder will inevitably attract voyeurs of the 
lurid in addition to other readers.50 Given the continuing commercial appeal both 
of the Third Reich and of murder plain and simple, it is no wonder that Hitler's 
Willing Executioners has garnered the attention of the mass media which, famous for 
45 'Kinkel weist These von Kollektivschuld zur?ck', SZ, 9 May 1996, 13. 
46 
Frei, 'Ein Volk von Endlosem?' 13; Konrad Kwiet, of the United States Holocaust Memorial 
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German Question: Is This Holocaust an Ugly Truth 
- Or a Blood Libel?' Washington Post, 25 Apr. 
1996. See also Johannes Heil's observation that the book is an 'example of public-oriented historio 
graphy in the media-era 
- 
concrete, firm, and shrill', in 'Stirnrunzeln erlaubt: Aus Harvard nichts 
Neues', Berliner Zeitung, 17 Apr. 1996. See also Hans Mommsen's comments in Jochen Arntz, 'Wenn 
die Dinge so einfach l?gen', Berliner Zeitung, 24 Jul. 1996. 
47 
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inflating the most mundane stories into 'newsworthy' events, predictably had a field 
day with such an arresting thesis as Goldhagen presents. Both in the United States 
and Germany, the print and visual media elevated Hitler's Willing Executioners far 
beyond the point it would have attained on its own scholarly merits.51 Especially in 
Germany, a kind of media midwifery, rooted in the desire to propel the book into 
the centre of a larger controversy, created an 'event' worthy of widespread media 
coverage. Having become 
a sensation partially 
as a result of such factors, the 
Goldhagen controversy appears somewhat hollow in character. 
This hollowness is further demonstrated by the lack of substantive debate about 
the book. The first indication that a productive scholarly exchange was not in the 
offing appeared with Goldhagen's extended reply to his critics in Die Zeit in early 
August 1996. Eager to reproduce its prominent role of the 1980s as a forum for the 
Historikerstreit, the newspaper granted Goldhagen a remarkable six pages in its 
weekly 'Dossier' section for him to expound on the reasons for 'The Failure of the 
Critics'.52 In it, however, Goldhagen did not so much refute his critics as chastise 
them for having misread and misrepresented his book. For Goldhagen, none of the 
objections raised about his book were valid. The critics who aimed to 'demean' it 
had 'failed fundamentally', their accusations 
were 'hollow', 'indefensible', and 
'implausible'.53 Claiming that his critics have focused mostly .on his discussion of 
anti-Semitism (which he 'defends emphatically') Goldhagen dismissed criticism of 
his work by saying that his critics have themselves failed to deliver a more 
convincing explanation for the behaviour of the perpetrators.54 This is rather like 
denying one has cheated in an exam by claiming that one's accusers failed to get a 
better grade. To be sure, in certain instances 
- 
notably, those involving ad hominem 
attacks accusing him of anti-German prejudices 
- 
Goldhagen's points of rebuttal are 
well taken.55 But on substantive issues he has not convincingly refuted his many 
critics. 
Most damaging is Goldhagen's dismissal of his critics' concerns regarding his 
failure to adopt a comparative perspective for explaining the Holocaust. He argues 
mistakenly that such critics intend to obscure altogether the role of anti-Semitism in 
the Germans' killings where, in fact, they merely object to Goldhagen's assertions of 
its singular German quality.56 It is incontestable, to be sure, that German killers 
were motivated, in large part, by anti-Semitism; yet it is only through comparison 
that Goldhagen's thesis for the uniquely savage, German character of the mass 
murders can be verified. Goldhagen evades the issue of comparison altogether, 
51 That the New York Times, for example, devoted four articles to the book and its author before 
its publication attests to the level of media promotion. See Gulie Ne'eman Arad, 'Ein amerikanischer 
Alptraum', in Schoeps, Ein Volk von M?rdern? 176. 
52 Daniel J. Goldhagen, 'Das Versagen der Kritiker', Die Zeit, 2 Aug. 1996, 9-14. Goldhagen 
repeats many of the same points (now, however, with specific reference to his American critics) in his 
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however, by arguing that anti-Semitism was by itself insufficient to cause the 
Holocaust. Clearly responding to his critics' charges of monocausality, he asserts 
that, in addition to widespread anti-Semitism, other factors 
were needed, and these 
were found only in Germany: the presence of a regime advocating such an ideology 
as state policy and the geopolitical feasibility to carry it out.57 He concludes, 
therefore, that while other countries were antisemitic, the absence of like-minded 
governments advocating genocide as a policy makes them 'irrelevant' for explaining 
why the Holocaust happened in Germany. This claim, however, shifts the terms of 
the debate beyond the point that Goldhagen's book reaches. Hitler's Willing 
Executioners, after all, aims primarily to explain why ordinary Germans willingly 
killed Jews after the Nazi leadership had made such a programme into state policy. 
Goldhagen does not address whether other antisemitic peoples would have also 
killed Jews just as readily if their governments had decreed it as a primary state goal.58 
Goldhagen's inability to accept criticism on this important point is indicative of the 
single-mindedness with which he defends his theses. Instead of engaging his critics 
(who, after all, include many eminent scholars in addition to less notable figures), he 
evasively asks, 'if my book is really as wrong as my critics claim, why have they 
failed to refute its most important conclusions with overwhelming proof?' Gold 
hagen's resistance to criticism is further indicated by his frustrated lament: 'Is it 
possible that so many reviewers have misrepresented my book?'59 While such 
comments may have been partly intended to persuade German readers to decide 
about the book's merits for themselves, they indicate a general failure on his part to 
confront his critics. 
Goldhagen's apparent failure directly to address the criticisms of his book 
persisted, moreover, during his whirlwind speaking tour of Germany in autumn 
1996. Here again a comparison with The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich is 
appropriate. Discouraged from speaking about his book in Germany because of 
possible lawsuits, Shirer ultimately concluded that it was best to 'avoid becoming 
embroiled in futile public debate' and to let 'the book . . . speak for itself'.60 
Precisely at a time when public debate on the Third Reich was rare and sorely 
needed, Shirer's absence from Germany prevented such a discussion from materi 
57 
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Executioners, 9, 416. Given this objective, he should not be concerned with establishing why the Nazis 
rose to power as an explanation for the Holocaust. This issue, of course, has less to do with a German 
tradition of anti-Semitism than with contingent factors related to the crisis of liberalism in Weimar. 
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alising. In contrast, Goldhagen engaged in an outright media blitz of the Federal 
Republic, appearing on panel discussions of his book on German television and at 
several highly publicised debates in Hamburg, Berlin, Frankfurt, and Munich (in 
front of crowds ranging from 600 to 2,000 persons). Nowhere in Germany, 
however, did the much-expected fireworks erupt. Instead, Goldhagen and his 
'critics' engaged in a rather civil exchange in which Goldhagen notably won 
considerable popular sympathy. The reasons for this extremely surprising response 
were several. For one, Goldhagen evidently moderated his strident views while in 
Germany. Rather than acting as the firebrand author one would expect from 
reading his book, he disarmed his critics by exhibiting what various observers have 
described as 'charisma' and 'charm' and pre-empted their objections to his theses by 
backtracking from his prior stridency. Goldhagen's moderation, which was echoed 
in the softened German translation of Hitler's Willing Executioners, helped him win 
over his audiences by making him appear gracious, while his critics, Hans 
Mommsen in particular, 
came across as 
overly critical, scholastic, and petty.61 
Goldhagen's German critics acquired a negative image, moreover, despite having 
moderated their own objections to his position. Perhaps fearing for their own 
reputations in the light of Goldhagen's burgeoning popularity, critics who were 
quite harsh towards Goldhagen in April 1996, such as Norbert Frei and Rudolf 
Augstein, appeared more coll?gial during his recent tour of Germany. Some, such as 
Jan Phillip Reemtsma, even defended some of his assertions.62 
Given the fact that Goldhagen and his critics generally talked past one another in 
Germany, the doubts, expressed early on by various observers, that Hitler's Willing 
Executioners would provoke a new Historikerstreit seem to be confirmed.63 Compared 
with previous historiographical debates, there does not appear to be much that is 
substantive behind the controversy surrounding Goldhagen's book. Thus, while the 
Historikerstreit was a genuine barometer of political infighting over the future course 
of Germany's national identity, and while the controversy over The Rise and Fall of the 
Third Reich reflected real concerns in the early 1960s over the implications of the 
nation's Nazi past on its future development, the controversy over Goldhagen's book 
61 In the German translation, Goldhagen no longer claims to have written a 'radical revision' of all 
prior scholarship and generally softens his prior indictment of the German people. Jost Nolte, 'Die 
Kunst es nicht gesagt zu haben', Die Welt, 2 Sep. 1996; '"Riesige Mehrheit"', Der Spiegel, 33 (1996), 
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contrast, yet again, with Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, whose German publisher, 
Kiepenheuer & Witsch, ultimately abandoned initial plans to purge the book's 'anti-German' sections 
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does not seem to reflect the presence of larger political factors. One could not be 
blamed, therefore, for coming to the simple conclusion that the controversy 
over 
Hitler's Willing Executioners has, to a large extent, been produced by a combination of 
its own internal weaknesses and the immense publicity given to it by the mass media. 
Still, the controversy over Hitler's Willing Executioners provides certain lessons 
about current perceptions about the Holocaust. For one, it supplies further proof of 
the continuing gap between popular and scholarly views of the Holocaust. Scholars, 
it is clear, have rejected the book's central assertions nearly unanimously; many, 
indeed, want to hear no more about it, as was demonstrated by the refusal of 
German historians to debate the book anew at the German Historikertag in Munich 
in September 1996.64 Yet, as discussions of the book in the United States and 
Germany have shown, the generally laudatory reaction of the public to Goldhagen's 
arguments and the critical response to those of his opponents seem to indicate 
widespread sympathy for Goldhagen's simple explanation of the Holocaust. Among 
Jews, both in the United States and Germany, this reaction is predictable 
? 
especially 
among Holocaust survivors who, Goldhagen says, have approved of his conclusions 
wholeheartedly.65 Not all Jews, of course, share Goldhagen's sweeping views; 
important European Jewish leaders such as Ignaz Bubis and Simon Wiesenthal have 
criticised Goldhagen's thesis publicly.66 Many, however, have long shared Gold 
hagen's radically intentionalist position and have supported his emphatic confirma 
tion of it. 
What is more surprising is Goldhagen's popularity in Germany. Especially in the 
light of the hostile press response to Hitler's Willing Executioners in April 1996, the 
more recent support displayed for Goldhagen in Germany demands explanation. 
Although some degree of this popularity can be attributed to Goldhagen's 
prominent media exposure, much 
more of it may reflect new trends in the 
Germans' process of 'coming to terms' with the Nazi past. The willingness of a 
young generation of postwar Germans finally to 'unearth the repressed knowledge' 
of their elders' wartime crimes has been noted by many observers.67 The embrace of 
Goldhagen's book, according 
to this view, reflects a new desire of Germans to 
accept the full moral responsibility for the historical evil committed by their 
compatriots. One must be careful, of course, not to overestimate the current level of 
German support for Goldhagen. After all, what has been described as his 'triumphal 
parade' through Germany has been based largely on book sales and, perhaps more 
importantly, audience response at his public speaking engagements.68 While these 
64 'Schreckbild oder Vorbild?' Berliner Zeitung, 21 Sep. 1996. 
65 Indicative of this feeling was a letter to the editor sent to the Jewish Journal of Los Angeles, 
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audiences were no doubt mixed, their representativeness of the nation at large 
is uncertain; they were not only relatively small but may have been constituted, 
to a significant degree, by the converted who came to hear the words of their 
favourite preacher. Moreover, the appearance of ad hominem attacks against 
Goldhagen in Germany 
? 
claiming, among other things, that he may be responsible 
for stirring up anti-Semitism 
- also shows that German support for his work is 
hardly unanimous.69 Nevertheless, the considerable German attention to Hitler's 
Willing Executioners confirms the commonly made assertion that, despite the recent 
fiftieth anniversary commemorations of the end of the Third Reich and the 
Second World War, no final line (Schlu?strich) can, as yet, be drawn under the 
Nazi past.70 
This conclusion, however, is far less interesting than the surfacing of actual 
support for Goldhagen's thesis. It is noteworthy that at least a minority of Germans 
have accepted the most scathing of verdicts upon the most shameful aspect of their 
nation's past. Various German critics have noted the significance of this trend and 
have welcomed it. Writing that 'one can be a bit proud of this reaction', Josef Joffe 
has described the support of 'ordinary Germans' for Goldhagen's head-on confron 
tation with the horror of the Holocaust as a deed that 'honours them'.71 Non 
German critics also have voiced similar feelings, such as the Israeli journalist, Amos 
Elon, who praised the Germans' openness to Goldhagen's message and commended 
the decision of the Bonn-based Journal for German and International Politics to award 
Goldhagen its Democracy Prize.72 To be sure, it is both worthy and necessary for 
Germans to confront the crimes committed against the Jews under the Nazi regime. 
And yet, the acceptance of Goldhagen's simple explanation of the Holocaust gives 
cause for concern. For in accepting Goldhagen's thesis, 
a 
significant number of 
Germans have ignored some serious flaws in his book. This apparent lapse in critical 
judgement may have several explanations. In part, it may be due to a lack of self 
confidence among Germans to evaluate a work of scholarship delivered by a 
'representative' of the victims (Goldhagen, it is well known, is not only Jewish but 
also the son of a Holocaust survivor). The uncritical embrace of Goldhagen's 
problematic study further testifies to a general yielding to emotion among his 
German supporters. This is the conclusion of certain German critics, such as Hans 
Mommsen, who have spoken of 'the German public's flight into irrationality'.73 
69 This belief was expressed in Marion Gr?fin D?nhoffs article, 'Warum D. J. Goldhagens Buch 
in die Irre f?hrt'. For a comment on this position see Josef Joffe, 'Die Hunde schlafen schlecht', SZ, 24 
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More moderate critics, such as J?rgen Kocka, have described the embrace of 
Goldhagen's work 
as the result of the preference for 
an emotional catharsis rather 
than for more differentiated and 'scientific' historical explanations 
? the very same 
needs that elevated the television docudrama, Holocaust, in 1979, and the film 
Schindlers List in 1994 to such heights of popularity.74 The graphic narrative of 
Hitler's Willing Executioners and its straightforward analytical explanation may well 
provide some readers with a ready cathartic release. But, like the two films before it, 
one wonders about its long-term contribution to deeper historical understanding. 
To be sure, historical understanding is not the sole means of coming to terms with 
the past. Many critics in 1979, for example, tolerated Holocaust's historical and 
aesthetic flaws in the light of its pedagogical and political virtues 
- in particular, its 
prompting of an emotional confrontation with the Holocaust at a time when the 
moral lessons of the Nazi past seemed to be fading.75 Nearly twenty years later, 
however 
- 
especially after the commemorative 
wave of the 1980s and early 1990s 
- 
public awareness of the Holocaust has moved well beyond the point where simply 
any degree of attention to it, regardless of scholarly merit, is salutary. 
Indeed, it can be argued that an emotionally driven confrontation with the 
Holocaust may have the effect of discouraging a thorough reckoning with it. One 
senses that the popular embrace of Goldhagen's view of the Holocaust is partially 
rooted in impatience, in the desire finally to attain an easily comprehensible, 
emotionally satisfying explanation for an event that scholars have either described in 
complex, distanced terms or regarded as ultimately inexplicable.76 Such impatience 
may be rooted, moreover, in the wish of some Germans finally to escape the 
burden of guilt for the Holocaust altogether. By accepting the simplest of all 
imaginable explanations of the Holocaust, after all, one no longer needs to grapple 
further with its most unfathomable dimensions. The embrace of a book which 
claims finally to have resolved the fundamental problem of the Holocaust, there 
fore, may well reflect the desire to forget rather than to remember the Nazi crimes. 
For after accepting Goldhagen's uncompromising explanation of the Holocaust and 
the historical legacy of guilt which it entails, what further measures can Germans 
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possibly take to come to terms with the Nazi past? Accepting Goldhagen's 
conclusions seems tailor-made, therefore, to draw the proverbial Schlu?strich under 
the Nazi past. And yet, one wonders whether most Germans have truly recognised 
the severity of Goldhagen's verdict. Ironically enough, Goldhagen's tough medicine 
may in fact be quite easy to swallow. His claim (contained in a much-celebrated 
footnote and frequently voiced in public) that, after 1945, the re-education of the 
Germans banished the antisemitic curse for good, actually may 
serve to free 
contemporary Germans from the fear 
- 
commonly held by scholars who 
see 
modern forces at work in genocide 
? 
that their nation might 
once 
again repeat the 
crimes of its antisemitic past.77 While it is difficult to know how widespread such 
feelings may be, the rupture that Goldhagen identifies between the Third Reich 
and the Federal Republic makes it easier for younger Germans to confront the 
crimes of the Nazis. After all, how painful can it be for this generation, more than 
fifty years since the Holocaust, to hear their grandparents' generation indicted? It 
is this historical distance that no doubt helps explain the readiness of some 
Germans to accept Goldhagen's message. As noted above, however, this readiness 
should not be praised too quickly. For by accepting the conclusions of Hitler's 
Willing Executioners, Germans may not so much be helping to preserve the past in 
memory as obviating the further need to wrestle with its profoundly disturbing 
implications. 
It is too early 
to 
predict whether 
or not the controversy surrounding Hitler's 
Willing Executioners will constitute a final expression, or merely a new phase, in the 
German struggle with the Nazi past. The task of Vergangenheitsbew?ltigung, after all, is 
one of uncertain duration, seemingly finished 
at one moment only to resurface at 
the next. Assertions, for example, that the cathartic German reaction 
to the 
docudrama Holocaust in 1979 represented the long-awaited overcoming of the 
inability to mourn and an open encounter with the full nature of the Nazi past were 
confounded by the eruption of the Bitburg Affair in 1985 and the Historikerstreit the 
year after.78 There is much to suggest that the legacy of the Third Reich and the 
Holocaust will never be fully mastered, if by 'mastered' a point of completion or 
finitude is thereby implied; rather, it is more likely that these traumatic episodes in 
Germany's national past will be continually worked through in a dialectical manner 
over time. Indeed, in the same way that the docudrama Holocaust (and the film, 
Shoah, by Claude Lanzmann) helped spawn Edgar Reitz's normalised depiction of 
everyday life under the Nazis in his film, Heimat, several years later, Hitler's Willing 
Executioners will probably spark some type of backlash and help usher in new works 
of history contesting those dimensions of the Holocaust that Goldhagen identifies as 
77 
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quintessentially German.79 Regardless of what it may evoke from others in the 
future, however, Goldhagen's book has already assumed a place in the long ongoing 
German struggle with its past. 
And yet, whatever its ultimate historic importance, the controversy surrounding 
Hitler's Willing Executioners will probably do little to bolster its scholarly reputation. 
It seems likely that the book will be remembered more for the reaction it caused 
than for the value of the argument it presented. Although considerable attention has 
recently been placed on the book's salutary function as a means to a desired end 
? 
that of leading today's 'ordinary Germans' to confront the horrors of the Holocaust 
- such standards should not, in the long run, be used to judge the book's ultimate 
value. Should they be, then any author could gain recognition by advancing a 
radical (and not so easily defensible) thesis, so long as it sparks controversy. And 
while the generation of a public response is certainly one of the achievements of 
Goldhagen's book, such an accomplishment should not be allowed to define the 
standards for distinguished scholarship now or in the future. Most probably, once 
the furor dies down, the book will be judged on its intrinsic merits and seen as 
wanting. It is unlikely that, over time, Hitler's Willing Executioners will attain a 
reputation comparable with that of, say, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. This 
will probably be the case for several reasons. Goldhagen's book, for one, is simply 
less readable than Shirer's, the latter being a gripping tale written by an experienced 
journalist, whereas the former, while harrowing in its details, is much too repetitive, 
cluttered with cumbersome social scientific formulations, and too academic in style 
to retain a large popular audience. Neither will the already unfavourable reputation 
of Hitler's Willing Executioners among scholars improve in the long run. Compared 
with Shirer's study which, as a largely descriptive narrative of the Third Reich's 
origins, did not harbour lofty scholarly pretensions, Goldhagen's more analytically 
ambitious work has fallen quite short of its intended goal. The controversy over 
Hitler's Willing Executioners may well reflect new trends in the memory of the 
Holocaust, but the absence of broader factors underlying the furor suggests that the 
book's reputation will diminish over time. Meanwhile, one can only hope that it 
does not do more harm than good. 
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on Wehrmacht crimes during the Second World War has been seen as a sublimated kind of backlash 
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